



Logical refutations & Establishment of Knower [Self]

In

Īśvarapratyabhijñā vimarśinī

*Sampath kumar Medavarapu
Ahmedabad*

The **Pratyabhijñā** system is the philosophical foundation of the Trika.

We cannot rule out the possibility that consciousness, or the self, is not merely an epistemological principle but also an ontological entity. Besides accepting the existence of the ontological self as a possibility, we can also accept it as a hypothesis as legitimate as the biological theory that consciousness is a cerebral activity.

The doctrine Presented systematically for the first time by *somānanda* in his *śivadr̥ṣṭi*, reflected in *Īśvarapratyabhijñā kārikā* and the Vritti thereon and elaborated in the Vritti on them by Utpalacarya, and elucidated by Abhinavagupta in his two commentaries.

The *kārikā* of Utpala Deva , without the commentary the *vimarśinī* is extremely difficult to understand. But the commentary of AG also is notoriously difficult. The Saiva Philosophy is prior to the **vaiśeṣikā** , the **Nyāya** and the Vedanta.

The existence of the self is proved by logic and confirmed by experience.

Abhinavagupta's contribution to the "Realistic Idealism" is of the same nature as that of the great *śaṅkara* to the monistic Idealism of the Vedanta.

A comparative study of the arguments employed by **śāntarakṣita** [705-762 A.D]and **pañjikā of kamalaśīla** [713-763 A.D] in the “Tattvasamgrah” to refute the soul-theory and the Buddhist arguments as quoted in the IPV might throw some light on the problem. An examination of the arguments employed by **śāntarakṣita** and **kamalaśīla** to refute the soul-theory reveals the fact they are noticeably similar to the Buddhist arguments reconstructed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta against the self. The arguments "which disproves the grounding of the changing mental states, impressions, cognition etc, in the self is similar to

the one quoted in the *vimarśinī* about the difficulty of self being the substratum of memory impressions without forfeiting its eternal character¹ Compare particularly in Tattva Sangraha;[172-284].

Utpaladeva and **Abhinavagupta** were presented an immensely complex argumentation in their text and commentary to prove the existence of Knower.

KS proposition -The self is consciousness [soul], it is self luminous therefore, self-proved, and eternal. In the second verse of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā kārikā*, Utpaladeva summarizes the argument that the self, or consciousness, is self-proved .The self is the doer and the knower. Abhinavagupta argues that acceptance of a knowing consciousness is a logical necessity. Without consciousness the world would remain unknown. Even if I deny the self and say, "I am not," this statement itself proves that I am.

Buddhist argument as summarized by Utpala ;

Summery -There is no self because none can be perceived - "Indeterminate cognition has no variety, the determinate cognition has various expressions. Neither belongs to an eternal experienced, because none such is experienced. The I – consciousness has reference only to the body. The I - consciousness itself is not the self, because it is a determinate cognition and it is transitory in its nature. There is nothing different from body etc.

Reply-If the experiencing self were not permanent, then how memory is possible?

Objection- "How can memory claim to have the same object as that of some other cognition?" the direct experience being destroyed, how could there be memory of things, experienced through that?

Reply-Due to the residual traces [**saṃskāra**]of the former direct experience memory is possible.

Objection:- "If it be so, why then admit the useless permanent self? Like an appendix.

Reply- But the substratum of the residual trace has to be stated. For, the residual trace is a quality [**kaṇāda view**] and, therefore, needs a substratum. That substratum itself is the self (Atma).

Objection:- Even though the residual traces be admitted to be different from self, yet, there being no change in the essential nature of self (due to residual traces), remembrance has to

¹ - Śaiva Encounter With Buddhism In Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī-23 page

be admitted to be due to residual trace only. Hence the separate remembered is a mere Supposition [imagination] just like the doer.

If self is affected by qualities, it ceases to be eternal: Otherwise (if it retains its original nature in spite of affection by qualities) the admission of affection is meaningless. If (power of) cognition be admitted to be self-manifest (citsvarupa) like self? Then is it transient? [Passing with time; transitory] Or eternal? But if it be insentient, how can it illumine or make manifest the objects?

Refutation:- “I know the pot.” means “the pot is manifest to me”. Here "How the objects become luminous?

The object is reflected in that Buddhi it is capable of receiving reflection, the cognition nothing but the reflection of external object on Buddhi.

Thus Buddhi assumes the form of external object .But Buddhi lacks of self-luminosity like a mirror [the mirror on which the heap of fair is reflected cannot burn anything]

So an experienced, therefore which is different from Buddhi has to be admitted. The essential nature of the experienced is self-luminosity, because of his self-luminosity, the entire Objective world should shine simultaneously and there should be no distinction between cognition of jar and that of cloth. [Why does it assume the form of the object?" the reply is 'because of the already existing chain of causation (i.e. the revival of the previous beginningless Vasana)].

Objection:- If so Why then not assume the Buddhi to be sentient (cinmayi);

What is the use of assuming separate existence of Self ?

Refutation:- If Buddhi itself be admitted to be sentient, its eternality will naturally follow, but if even the sentient is not eternal, then there is no eternal self. Therefore, **jñāna** alone is. Its essential nature is to make the objects manifest. It is of different types, such as determinate knowledge and the remembrance. Illumination is not a quality [**guṇa**] of light. it is the very nature [**svarupa**] of light. Consciousness and knowledge are substantially one. They are two only connotatively [in addition to its literal meaning], denotatively they are one and the same.

Objection:- Action also is nothing else than the presence of such external things as body etc., at various places etc. - In the perceptible **movement** "He goes", "He moves", "He falls"

etc., we find nothing more than a certain form, such as that of Devadatta, which was at first at a place in the house, but subsequently is found at another place outside it. We do not perceive anything more than this which may be called action.

In the *experience* "milk changes" that which was experienced as sweet and liquid, is experienced as sour and solid. The view that it (action) is one and successive and belongs to one (agent) is also not sound."

Thus, 'action' is not directly perceived anywhere, and because there is no direct perception, therefore, we cannot infer it either. For, inference depends upon the former (direct perception). And the effect, such as reaching the village etc., is non-different from the succeeding momentary existence of a particular time, thing and form etc. Therefore, it (kriya) cannot be assumed for the reason that the effect is not possible without "it is known through neither of the two means of right knowledge, direct perception and inference, [*Pratyksha & Anumana*]" asserts- the absence of arguments to justify the assumption of "action" (Kriya). Action is one and successive and belongs to one agent is also not sound.

tatra tatra sthite tattadbhavaṭītyeva dṛśyate ।

nānyannānyo'sti sambandhaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvataḥ ॥ IPV-2-10

Only this much is perceived that certain things being existent other things come into being. There is no other relation than that of cause and effect. we perceive only the various stages of clay in making a jar and nothing more such as relation is directly perceived or inferred. So there is no such relation of cause and effect between knowledge or action and the self.

dviṣṭhasyānekanūpatvāt siddhasyānyānapekṣaṇāt ।

pāraṇtryādyayogācca tena kartāpi kalpitaḥ ॥ IPV-2-11 ॥

There is nothing like relation (Sambandha) apart from momentary existences; because relation exists between two multiplicity of forms. The accomplished (Siddha), however, needs none: nor is it related to another by relation of dependence. But how is that possible? For, what is present in its being at one place cannot also be present at another, because that involves change in form. Thus, conjunction [संयोग], Inherence [समवाय] and other relations, dependent upon them, the relation among the sentient and the insentient in our practical life, is also not possible. Therefore, the relation of the self with action as its agent is a mere supposition. So just as knower and doer is a mere supposition and not real. 1-2

Refutation:2-Even though, remembrance may be admitted to be due to residual trace, yet it cannot illumine the former direct cognition, because luminosity of every cognition is self confined.

[The conception of cognition (Jnana), as different from self, as admitted by the Kanada and the Sankhya systems, KS agrees with them. But this refutation is a different one].

Experience is self-luminous. It cannot be the object of any other experience, for example- colour cannot be an object of experience of taste. The fact that those residual traces [similar to direct experience] which is the root cause of the memory cannot make the consciousness of similarity possible (in remembrance).

Here a question arises. What is self-luminous?

*satyapi bāhye taccharīra saṁkrāntaṁ na prakāśanaṁ jñānasya rūpaṁ bhavitumarhati,
paraprakāśanātmakanijarūpaprakāśanameva hi svaprakāśatvaṁ jñānasya bhaṁyate. IPV;1-3-2*

Even though there be external objects, still the luminosity (of Jnana), as reflected on the forms of external objects, cannot be rightly admitted to be the essential nature of cognition (Jnana). For, self-luminosity of cognition consists in making itself so manifest as to make others also manifest (and not in casting its light on another and shining in another).

The remembrance, being erroneous in its nature and, therefore, it is not self-shining, will not make the objects manifest. Even though it be accepted to be self-luminous, yet, its self-luminosity being confined to illumining itself and what is pictured up there, it would not explain practical attitude towards external objects.

Thus, all human transactions, which originate from unification of various kinds of cognitions, which mutually differ and cannot become one another's object, will come to an end." All transactions depend upon remembrance.

prathamamapi hi pratyakṣajñānam ahamitipūrvāpararūpānusaṁdhānena smaraṇānuprāṇitena vinā na ghaṭate, pramātari viśrāntyabhāvāt apratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt | evaṁ sukhādaḥ mantavyam | IPV;1-3-6

Bhaskari;

For instance, the very first (the most important kind of cognition) the direct perception (pratyakṣa jnana) is not possible without the conscious unification of the former and the latter states of self.

The cognitions are different from one another. The indeterminate knowledge is different from the determinate knowledge, it is limited by present time, and that also is different from remembrance. Therefore, these cognitions make their objects alone manifest, and, in respect

of the objects of other cognitions, are like insentient dumb and deaf or both and cannot make them manifest.

If there be not one great Lord, who is essentially self luminous, holds within all the innumerable forms of the universe and possesses the powers of cognition, remembrance and differentiation, how can it make the objects shine (manifest)?

*anena śaktitrayeṇa viśve vyavahārāḥ | tacca bhagavata eva śaktitrāyam yat tathābhūtānubhavit
smṛtṛ vikalpayitṛsvabhāva caitramaitrādyavabhāsanam | sa eva hi tena tena vapuṣā jñāti, smarati
vikalpayati ca | yathoktam ācāryeṇaiva :IPV;1-3-7*

यद्यप्यर्थस्थितिः प्राणपुर्यष्टकनियन्त्रिते ।

जीवे निरुद्धा तत्रापि परमात्मनि सा स्थिता ॥

'yadyapyarthasthitiḥ prāṇapuryaṣṭakaniyantrite |

jīve niruddhā tatrāpi paramātmāni sā sthitā ||'

Although practical approach to the objective world (apparently) depends on the individual subject, limited by vital power (prana) and the constituents of subtle body (**puryaṣṭaka**) yet (in reality) it depends upon the universal Self. 1-3.

Objection: -If the rise of remembrance from mere residual trace, then how will the power of the Lord, as admitted by you, make it possible?

Refutation: -The knower of the formerly experienced object, has continuous existence till the time of remembrance also; because he, who is of the nature of pure Samvid, is **free** from the limiting attribute of time. The Self-luminous principle (Samvedana), which is free from the limitation of time.

Objection: If so, it should be the experience of universal "I" [as holding the entire objective world with in itself].

But if it be the experience of the objects as "this", then it will be distinct from the Self-luminous principle, there are two alternatives: -

(1) If the objectivity (**idantā**) rests on "I" then, it being the state, known as *Sadasiva*, consciousness would be "I am this".

(2) But if it does not rest on "I", then the consciousness must be 'this'. And because there is the consciousness of novelty, therefore, it would be direct experience and not remembrance.

Refutation: -He is free to act and It does not shine in such a way , because it shines as associated with the body, time and place of the first perception, because of which it was

differentiated from the universal subject, and attached to limited "Aham". Therefore, consciousness of the time of the past direct experience, 'associated' with the present time of remembrance.

Objection: - But if the former experience itself is the externally manifested light of the object of remembrance, why not then say simply that the experience is the object of remembrance?. What is the use of this strange unification?

Refutation:- It is not so. Because, the former experience does not shine separately in remembrance as 'this', like an object. But it shines as 'I experienced before', because the experience shines only because of its resting on the subject.

The self is essentially the "I-consciousness". It is introvert in experiences, the former and the latter. As the self-luminous nature of the former experience, therefore, the unification of cognitions has to be admitted in remembrance.

Objection: - If direct experience does not shine apart from the rememberer? Then how the past and future etc. become manifest in the knowledge of a Yogin, that to without any relation with external object .Therefore, just as the experience of another becomes the object of Yogin's experience, so let one's own knowledge also be the object.

Refutation:-In that particular kind of knowledge of Yogins, the experiences of others do not shine as such. They rather shine as one with their own Samvid. They do not feel duality like general people. So one knowledge cannot be the object of another.

According to the **Buddhists**, the knowledge (Vijnana) is self-luminous in its essential nature. Now if this be the object of another knowledge, then its real nature of shining as self-luminous and not as the object of another knowledge, will be contradicted.

The **vaiśeṣikā** view that the self can be known through inference only, one knowledge is the object of another, leads to argumentum ad infinitum.

Yogin's, consciousness is distinction from others, because of the continuous impression of 'this ness' associated with the body and vital air [देह, प्राण] etc. of another person, which he formerly looked upon as a subject (Pramata), attributes the objectivity of the body etc. to the pure subjective aspect "Aham" and, therefore, erroneously thinks that knowledge to be the knowledge of another. But a Yogin, who has risen above the idea of duality, seeing all as one

with himself, realizes that the duality is his own creation. Thus, cognition is not the object of knowledge of a Yogin. Therefore one knowledge cannot be the object of another. *yadyahambhāvavīśrāntivaśāt anubhavaḥ smṛtau pṛthak na bhāti iti ucyate, tathā parāmarśāntaram sākṣādeva idantayā anubhavam parāmṛśat yadi vā idaṃbhā vocitaḥḥatādivīśrāntatām anubhavasya prathayat upalabdham, iti tadanusāreṇāpi kiṃ na vyavahriyate iti ? –IPV; 1-4-6.*

Objection: -If it be admitted that *perception* does not shine as *an object* in remembrance, a cognition cognizing a perception as "this" (e.g. "I had that perception) clearly shows the perception as resting on the external objects like jar, then, why do not we make use of that analogy?

Refutation:- People do not think that perception shines apart from remembrance as its object, as "I had that experience" For, all that is simply an elaboration of "I remember". It is an elaboration, based upon analysis.

even though a thing may be perceived indeterminately, yet so long as there is no determinate perception, there is no particular remembrance of it possible, as in the case of the straw and leaves etc. seen on the way.

So the form of determinate knowledge be "I see this" or "this is jar", it implies that the indeterminate cognition rests on the subject as one with it.

that experiencer or perceiver has various cognitions: 'I see' 'I saw' 'this' 'that', therefore, it is clear, that both, the knower (body etc.) and the known (jar etc.) ,in their distinctive nature, shine in the subject.1-4.

The shining of objects, as "this", is logically possible only if they be admitted to be within The true subject, who is essentially pure self-luminosity; If the object be not one with light [of thought or consciousness] it would remain non-manifest even (at the rise of knowledge) as it was before.

Objection: But how can you say, that the object would remain the same (devoid of light) even at the rise of knowledge, as it was before; because at the time of rise of knowledge, the momentary object, - which has become luminous, because of its association with other momentary existences, namely, those of senses and physical light etc., - is distinct from the previous one.

Refutation:- then the object should be manifest to all; this we talk of as a mere possibility:

Or it should be manifest to none: or, in reality, it should be blue only in itself. So without the help of light (of thought) no positive statement about anything is possible. If this light be different in the case of each different object, their unification will not be possible; the practical life of humanity will come to an end. Therefore, Consciousness is only one. The same has been shown by repetition: the light cannot be different (from the object).

Objection: If the Consciousness be different from the object and similar nature in itself, then confusion of one object with another would follow. Therefore, the object, that is made manifest, is not different from light. For, what is not light cannot be said to exist. So also in the case of remembrance, the residual trace having been revived by the perception of one thing, [out of many which were perceived together] the consciousness of all should forcibly follow. Thus there will be great confusion.

For example- "the knowledge of Nila" and "the knowledge of Pita" the aspects, the difference between Nila and Pita is to be known through the consciousness, but which Nila is known only as Nila, Pita also can be known only as such, (the light of consciousness being the same in both the cases). So the difference between one thing and the other has been established;

Refutation: if we accept the theory that the difference in knowledge is due to difference in the means etc., how can the knowledge, caused by multiplicity of objects, such as blue etc., in one, who is at the peak of a mountain, be clear in the case of one and indistinct in case of another object, because the light of consciousness is one and the same.

"Let there be the objects only; what is the use of admitting the existence of light which causes so great confusion?" The author says in reply that, what is not Consciousness cannot be said to have existence at all. **Utpala** confirms in another place, as-

एवमात्मन्यसत्कल्पाः प्रकाशस्यैव सन्त्यमी
जडाः प्रकाश एवास्ति स्वात्मनःस्वपरात्मभिः॥
evamātmanyasatkalpāḥ prakāśasyaiva santyamī
*jaḍāḥ prakāśa evāsti svātmanaḥsvaparātmabhiḥ*²

"Thus these insentient objects are as good as non-existent in themselves. They are manifestations of the Consciousness, which alone shines both as the subject and the object".

² - *ajāḍa pramāṭṛ siddhiḥ-13 verse*

Therefore, the object can exist only if it be 'consciousness', that only if the same 'consciousness', which appears in the form of cloth, be admitted to appear in the form of jar also.

New Objection: The *Sautrāntikas* holds the theory of representationism which postulates that external objects are not directly perceived, but are only inferred. The *Sautrāntikas* denied the reality of the past and the future in the direct sense, they admitted the reality only of the present. So their view that external objects were not directly perceived, but only inferred. This is called *Bāhyārthānumeya vāda*.

Refutation: Inference of an external reality is not possible.[following arguments already formulated by *Vijñānavādins*], because we are experiencing what consciousness manifests if not the external world remains in itself absolutely inaccessible to perception.

[The *Vijñānavādins* consider that residual traces similar to that, which left by previous experiences in dreamer's cognitive series, produces the variety of objects experienced in a dream[see Ratie 2010³]

But the *Sautrāntikas* argues these impregnations [*vāsanā*] are quite distinct from consciousness, because these are based on external entities. So that the *Vijñānavāda* is an externalism in different manner or they are not distinct from consciousness.

But in which case their variety, is inexplicable [is impossible to say] .So here the *Vijñānavādin* cannot account for consciousness's variety of aspects
Kashmir Śaivism agrees with *Vijñānavādins* in refuting *bāhyarthavāda*, the theory that matter has a real existence outside and independent of consciousness.

But unlike *Vijñānavāda*, it does not hold that material existence is like a dream.

Objection: The light of consciousness (Bodha), being without diversity in itself, cannot be the cause of variety in manifestation (indeterminate cognition). Therefore, this [variety in manifestation], being without any perceptible cause, leads to the inference of the external.

The revival of variety in vāsanā cannot be represented to be the cause. For, there is no answer to the question "what is the cause of revival of variety in the revived vāsanā ?

iha bodhaḥ tāvat abhinnaḥ, prakāśamātrameva hi asya paramārthaḥ, prakāśādhikaṃ yadi nīlasya rūpam, tarhi tat aprakāśarūpam iti na prakāśeta / atha tathā prakāśatvameva asya rūpam, pītaprakāśaḥ katham syāt / athāpi kramikanīlapitādiprakāśarūpameva tasya svarūpam,

³ -The dreamer and the Yogin-On the relation between Buddhist and Saiva idealisms.

nīladyābhāsaṇyo'hamiti prakāśaḥ

svāpādyavasthāsu na syāt / tasmāt prakāśaḥ

prakāśa eva, aṇumātramapi na rūpāntaram asya asti iti abhinno bodhaḥ,

[IPV1-

5-4,5 Comme]

According to **Vijñānavāda** ; In this world undoubtedly the consciousness is undifferentiated, its real nature is pure manifestation[**prakāśamātrata**] ;if can had blue as its form ,then how the yellow would shine? (because it is different from Nila).If it be supposed that its nature is to shine in succession as blue and yellow, etc...then the consciousness of self as free from affection external objects, in the state of deep sleep [**susuptiḥ**] will not be possible.

Therefore, manifestation is nothing but manifestation only [**prakāśaḥ prakāśa eva**]. So, the variety of manifestation of Nila and Pita etc., **being without any perceptible cause, leads to the inference of the external,**

vāsanā is nothing else than the residual traces of impressions. It is responsible for remembrance. that **vāsanā** is nothing else than the power of the consciousness [**jñāna**], capable of making the external objects manifest; But if these **vāsanā** also are **represented to have only imaginary existence**, then, as such they cannot be represented to be the causes of different perceptions.

But if it be said: they are the causes only in that aspect in which they are real, then their real aspect is only pure knowledge (Vijnana) and that has no diversity. Therefore, diversity in the worldly object cannot be explained. Thus, there being no essential diversity in **vāsanā** what hope can there be of there being any variety in their revival?

Or let there be different **vāsanā**. But there being nothing different from the light of consciousness (Bodha) truly existent such as time and space etc., then being no variety and so there being only one revival, all things should shine simultaneously. Those objective cognitions, which are within the chain of self-luminous self-consciousness, are the various causes of revival of different residual traces, is not sound, because all differences, whether in respect of pleasure or pain or Nila and Pita or former and later time or place, are essentially of the nature of light of consciousness (Vijnana) and Vijnana is in reality nothing else than "Light" itself; therefore, there being no possibility of difference in their essential nature there is no possibility of difference in cognitions.

— **The existence of another subject.**

speaking is invariably preceded by desire to speak, as its necessary cause. Therefore, we infer that in the case of another person, such as Caitra, also such an activity must be preceded by similar desire. But we know from our own experience that that desire is not in the chain, which we call ours. Thus it is clear that desire is another's and, therefore, that chain, to which that desire belongs, is another's?

Reply- The experience of speech in the inferer is in two ways:

1-at the time of acquiring the idea of *invariable concomitance [vyāptih]*, the experience is related to the subject as "I speak": but

2-at the time of inference it is related to the object, as "This (man) speaks".

The cause of experience "this man speaks" being unknown, how can the inference of another's desire from it be possible?

The experience "this man speaks" depends upon establishing the existence of another subject and the existence of the latter depends upon the former; the argument, therefore, has the fallacy of inter-dependence of the two terms. So there can be no idea of invariable concomitance between the two. If other subjects are different from one another all the subjects being not related to the same object, then their relation to the same object, should be out of question. Thus, people, unattached to one another, then the law "the knowledge and its object are one; because of their invariable concomitance", being not universally valid,

Therefore, the separate existence of different subjects is to be considered as not established. But if it is to be considered as established, then all the objective ideas (abhasas), which are within different subjects, would simultaneously bring about the revival of residual traces, which are responsible for difference in the objects of cognitions. For, there is no reason why only a particular residual trace should be revived.

Therefore, even if other subjects be admitted to exist, the difference of objects such as blue etc. from one another cannot be established. Thus, the difference in the residual traces as well as in the causes, responsible for their revival, cannot be shown to be consistent with reason. So, this is established that light of consciousness (Bodha) has no variety in itself.

That Lord's, essential nature is sentiency, externally manifests, like a Yogin, all the objects which are within Him, according to His free will, without (requiring) any material cause."

anumānamābhātāpūrve naiveṣṭamindriyam

ābhātameva bījāderābhāsāddhetu vastunaḥ || 8 ||

ābhāsaḥ punarābhāsādbāhyasyāstīkathamāna larthasya naiva tenāsya siddhirnāpyanumānataḥ || 9 ||

The external reality based on inference is not possible and even if it does, it cannot establish the existence of external things. Because inference necessarily regards an object “that has already been perceived”. So no inference can be admitted. This [world] is unmanifested previously.

Sutrantikas-*nanu bhavatu pratyakṣato dr̥ṣṭe'numāne saṃkathā iyaṃ, sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭe tu kiṃ vakṣyasi yathā arthopalabdhyā indriyānumāne ?*

Sutrantikas-Fine –let us accept your version, an inference should be apprehended through a direct perception [*Pratyakṣato dr̥ṣṭa*] but it cannot be true in those cases in which inference is applied to the things, of which there has been only generic perception (*Samanyato dr̥ṣṭa*)⁴ then what will you say- as in the case of inference of sense organs [eye etc...] are inferred where as we never perceive them as such. Does it mean that we must infer the existence of our eyes and nose etc....?

Refutation: → *ucyate tatrāpi vikalpena yathā so'rthaḥ spṛśyate tathā anumeya iti sthitiḥ । vikalpaśca na indriyādikam arthaṃ kenacit saṃniveśaviśeṣādina [saṃniveśaviśeṣātmanā] viśeṣātmanā spṛśati, api tu kiṃcidupalabdheḥ kāraṇam iti amunā svabhāvena, sa ca svabhāvaḥ kāraṇatālakṣaṇaḥ pratyakṣagr̥hita eva । tathā ca bījāt anikuraḥ tantubhyaḥ paṭa ityādau kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ pratyakṣānupalambhabalena tāvat niśceyaḥ । tatra ca pratyakṣaṃ pratyābhāsaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ bhajate, vimarśalakṣaṇasya pramitivyāpārasya ekaikaśabdavācye'rthe pravṛtteḥ [viśrānteḥ k. s. s.] tadanusāritvācca pramāṇasya iti vakṣyate ।*

Refutation:- In that case of inference, based on generic perception also, the inferred object is to be of the same type as the one which was object of determinate cognition. For example; “Seed is the cause of sprout”, the relation of cause and effect is to be ascertained with the help of perception and non-perception. Of the two (*pratyakṣānupalambhayor madhye*) the perception operates; because the mental reaction (Vimarsa), which is nothing but determinative cognitive activity, refers to object, for which a single expression stands; and because the means of indeterminate cognition follows the same line as does that of the determinate one. This point will be asserted as follows: -

⁴ *Samanyato Dr̥ṣṭa*- [*Commonly seen*] is the knowledge of one thing derived from the perception of another thing with which it is commonly seen or seen together, e g. seeing a beast possessing horns. one infers that it possesses also a tail, or one infers the presence of water from the presence of cranes. [Vatsyayana., the first commentator on the Nyaya-sutra, takes the last to be ‘not commonly seen’ (*samanyato hyadr̥ṣṭa*), which he interprets as the knowledge of a thing which is *not* commonly seen, e g. observing affection, aversion and other qualities one infers that there is a substance called soul].

'ekābhīdhānaviṣaye mitirvastunyabādhitā '

"The un-contradicted cognition refers to the object, for which a single expression stands".

So in the case of cognition of causal relation between seed and sprout, there has already been generic cognition of causal relation,

*anupalambho'pi anyopalambharūpa ābhāsamātraviśrānta eva iti kāraṇābhāso viśeṣasūnyaḥ parigṛhīta eva bījāt
aṅkura iti pratītau / yat yasya niyamam anuvīdhatte avyatiriktam tat tasya kāryam iti pratighaṭam
mṛttikādirūpahetutadvanmātrasya ābhāsāt.*

*[anupalambhaḥ goṣvaśvatvānupalambhaḥ, anyopalambharūpaḥ aśvādiṣvaśvatvādyupalambharūpaḥ, pramātā
hi goṣu gotvaṁ pratyakṣeṇa paśyan aśvādiṣu tadanupalabhamānaḥ sarvagovyaktigataṁ gotvaṁ niścinoṭi]⁵*

That manifestation [Abhasa] as such is 'universal'. As for non-perception, that also is essentially nothing more than the perception of another thing and depends upon the Abhasa as such.

[Non-perception also, non-horseness in cows, perception – horseness in horses by having seen with his own eyes the knower [*pramātā*] confirms the cow-ness in cows].

So in the case of cognition of causal relation between seed and sprout, there has already been generic cognition of causal relation. In the case of every jar its having a cause as such in the form of clay etc. shines

Again questioning with **another objection-**

*ābhāsāt bāhyaḥ punaranābhāsarūpaḥ, sa ca ābhāsate iti vipratīṣiddham / anābhāse ca nāsti vikalparūpasya
anumānasya vyāpāraḥ / grāmagrāhādestu yat bāhyaṁ tat agrāmādirūpaṁ na ucyate pratyekaṁ
vāṭānūpakudṛyatulādeḥ bāhyatvaprasaṅgāt, api tu tat sannikṛṣṭam tasmāt grāmabāhyam ābhāsabāhyam iti ca
śabdāsāmyamātram etat na vastusāmyam /*

Then, an entity external to manifestation consists in a non-manifestation, and it is manifesting is contradictory. In the case of non-manifestation, the inference, which is of the nature of determinate knowledge, does not operate, due to lack of vyapti [invariable concomitance]. It is one general feature of externality that is present in various cognitions.

"Out of the village" or "out of the house" that which is out, is not meant to be different in nature from village or house: for, in that case the road, garden, tank, drainage and scale etc.

Refutation:-It shall have to be considered as different in their essential nature from village or house. In all such cases "out" [**bāhya**] simply means "near" Therefore, in "out of the

⁵ -[IPV-Bhaskari page-233]

village" and "out of light" there is only verbal similarity [*śabdasāmyamātram*] and not of meanings.

Dharmakīrti also confirmed that an inference is invalid if it rests on mere verbal similarity [*śabdasāmya*]

*vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyādabhedinaḥ |
na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍuravyādiva hutāśane ||1-14||⁶*

Thus, even according to those (**bauddhās**) who hold that the thing does not shine in determinate cognition, the use of inference is not justifiable in the case of the external. So "If the determinate cognition be error" that determinative activity of cognition also has its object, that shines. Therefore, if the external objects, blue etc... are not illuminated by the light of inference, which is a determinate cognition, then it cannot be represented to be inferred at all. It is consequently established that the sentient Lord Himself is the manifester.

Refutation: as follows: - *In order to infer*, the very notion of causality arises from five perceptions and non-perceptions. Without this set of experiences , we could not consider smoke as a logical reason for inferring fire as its cause at the same way in order to infer an external object , as the cause of this or that particular cognition, we need to perceive the external object in itself, but such a perception is impossible.

Second thing is there is no Vyapti ,[Invariable concomitance] due to lack of vyapti Anumeya external world would not be established. So world is नित्यनुमेयः , व्याप्ति रहितत्वात् ।

Question-He manifests externally what is present within. But how do you establish the presence of all within Him?

Answer- when things are manifest externally their internality does not get broken. But externality consists in "this" consciousness where rightly there should be "I" consciousness. In this variety of manifestations also, Samvid makes **the perceivers one in relation** to certain manifestations,

आभासे प्रमातृन् एकीकरोति नितम्बिनीनृत्त इव प्रेक्षकान्।

i.e. it makes the spectators one in relation to the dance of a heavy hipped dancing woman. For, they become one in relation to that particular manifestation (dance) only.

⁶ -Pramana Vartikam; 1-14

The determinacy, (Adhyavasa) which is expressed as "this is jar", is the power of the Highest Lord, beyond name and form. It always shines as (one with Him) "I" and never as "this."

Objection: If all cognitions rest on I - consciousness, so, there being no connection with time or space, how can various cognitions, as coming in succession one after the other, either in relation to space or certain aspects of the subject etc., be explained?

Refutation: It is only because of the affection by temporal and spatial limitation of the variety of objects that cognition, remembrance and intellectual reaction (adhyavasaya) etc. appear to be successive. **1-5**

Now **the power of differentiation** (apohana śaktiḥ),

Determinacy is the act of constructing many images (in consequence of contact with one object) which it was at first doubted to be. Therefore, in determinacy, there is always differentiation of what the object of cognition is from what it is not.

Objection: There is the possibility of appearance (at the same place) of both jar and not-jar [cloth or something], which are essentially different from each other. The possibility of appearance of both jar and cloth (at the place where jar alone is present) there is room for superimposition.

When there is superimposition of a thing of different nature (on jar) then alone there is room for the power of differentiation (Apohana) to function in refuting what is superimposed. For, superimposition is always of something that belongs to the same category. In this case how power of differentiation would work?

Refutation: According to KS system, all the objects shine within that subject. These objects are essentially of the nature of pure consciousness only, and shine as one with the subject, exactly in the manner in which a city shines in a mirror.

Thus, both the images, of "this" i.e. 'jar' and of 'not-this' i.e. "not-jar" are present within the subject. Therefore, in the state of indeterminacy, jar is one with pure consciousness.

The Subject, while manifesting the activity of Maya, splits this perfect being that (manifestation of activity of Maya) he differentiates jar from not-jar, self and cloth etc.

Then we speak of certainty about the jar "this is jar and nothing else".

IMP-The I - consciousness is of two kinds, one is pure and the other is due to Maya.

1-Pure is that which rests on pure Samvid which is non-different from the universe, or on that pure self, in which the whole universe is reflected.

2- Impure self-consciousness, - which rests on body etc., which are of the nature of an object, and exist separately from other bodies and jars etc., - is undoubtedly a determinacy. This is the substance.

In perception, in which the objects are externally manifest, the manifestation is due to freedom [Svatantrya], but in remembrance etc. it is due to the residual traces of the former experience.-1-6

Presentation of One substratum

Powers like **remembrance**, **knowledge** and **differentiation** cannot exist independently, therefore, the substratum is needed. That is I-consciousness [Knower, subject]

In the experience "jar shines" the light of consciousness is related to object:

yet the light of consciousness does not belong to the object as its own essential nature: on the contrary, the light of consciousness itself shines as object; because the object always shines on the background of subject e.g. "shines to me".

Various cognitions different temporal and spatial orders and are self-confined, Have their being in the subject then only the mutual connection of the objects can be explained.

It can be proved through this logic

The cause and effect theory is well established in Buddhist logic book *Hetubindu*⁷ by Dharmakīrti, here Utpala Deva piercing the opponent's eye with his opponent's own finger itself.

कार्यहेतौ कार्यकारणभावसिद्धिः यथेदमस्योपलम्भे उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तप्रागनुपलब्धमुपलभ्यते।
सत्स्वपि अन्येषु हेतुषु अस्याभावे न भवतीति अतस्तद्भावे भावः तदभावेऽभावश्च
प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भ साधनः कार्यकारणभावः तस्य सिद्धिः।

*kāryahetau kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ yathedamasyopalambhe upalabdhilakṣaṇa
prāptamanupalabdhāmupalabhyate| satsvapi anyeṣu hetuṣu asyābhāve na bhavātīti atastadbhāve bhāvaḥ
tadabhāve: 'bhāvaśca pratyakṣānupalambha sādhanahkāryakāraṇabhāvaḥtasya siddhiḥ|*

1-The causal relation between fire and smoke is established by means of five i.e.

⁷ -Hetu bindu Tika -page-54

Two perceptions and three non-perceptions. When (1) a person perceives fire, (2) he does not see smoke, and then (3) he directly perceives smoke. If (4) he does not see fire, (5) he does not find smoke also.

When these five perceived by different persons, cannot give an idea of any relation of cause and effect between fire and smoke, so they can not get any idea of relation.

So remembrance itself is not possible without one subject.

Objection: How the power of remembrance bring together the effects of various perceptions and non-perceptions?

In remembrance, the perception itself is of the nature of knowledge and not an object, and it cannot, be the object of another knowledge, because one knowledge cannot be the object of another: on the contrary, it is self-luminous. Further, if it (being momentary) has no existence at the time of remembrance, how can it shine? And even if it be supposed to be existing, then also these two cognitions, remembrance and perception, are different from each other. Therefore, remembrance will never be possible.

Refutation: The self-consciousness in remembrance is the same as that in perception. There is nothing else than self-consciousness, whether it be perception or inference, which can make remembrance possible.

That self-consciousness, which has continued existence, without any break, between the time of perception and that of remembrance, is the essence of the subject.

Objection: We admit the validity of determinate cognitions. But, how to admit the invalidity is due to contradiction. And how can we talk of invalidity of any determinate cognition when there is no contradiction?

The relation of contraries (**badhyabadhaka bhāva**) is possible only as a result of resting of all cognitions, "this is mother-of-pearl and not silver" if these two perceptions, resting on their separate objects, and can not refute each other .

A- Two cognitions "blue" and "lotus", resting in the subject, rest as mutually connected as adjective and noun;

B- Similarly "jar" and "cloth" (rest in the subject) as exclusive of each other.

C- But in the case of "this is mother-of-pearl" or "this is not silver"

The consciousness "this is not silver" rests in the subject as destroying the previous consciousness "this is silver" and consequently stopping any action that follows the right knowledge.

viviktabhūtalajñānaṃ ghaṭābhāvatiriyathā ।

tathā cecchuktikājñānaṃ rūpyajñānāpramātvavit॥ IPV; 1-7-7

But if you say that just as the consciousness of the absence of jar on the ground is nothing else than consciousness of bareness of the ground;

So certainty about mother-of-pearl is nothing but the consciousness of invalidity of perception of silver. So the cognition of silver is the realization of its invalidity.

Therefore, the relation of the contraries can thus be accounted for, and that accordingly Oneness of the subject is unnecessary.

Refutation: No, that is not right, from mere knowledge of the ground, its (ground's) being a separate entity from jar may be established, but certainly it cannot establish the absence or non-existence of jar (on the ground) which is capable of being perceived. Because, The ground is always separate from other things; because all objects have their separate and self confined existence. Then how that knowledge of the ground is the cause of consciousness of absence [or non-existence] of other things at one time and not at another? And also it cannot be said that there is no **piśāca** [devil] . For, the jar cannot have its existence within the mass of light, because in its presence mass of light will break. Therefore, it is established "there is no jar". But **piśāca** is of such a nature that even though he may be present within the light or the ground, so his existence within the ground cannot totally be denied.

Objection: So the consciousness "This is mother-of-pearl" or "It is not silver" may shine in itself as

"I am valid in relation to mother-of-pearl and not-being of silver, but not in relation to silver".

But this does not affect former perception of silver in any way.

Then how can, silver, grasped by a former perception, be proved to be false?

The word "this" refers to the same object as that which was the basis of valid knowledge of silver and now is that of "mother-of-pearl" or "not silver".

Therefore, from this we infer that the former perception of "silver" was invalid.

It is not possible- because those two valid, even though contrary, cognitions may refer to the same object. Therefore, this relation of contraries in practical life is due to inference.

Refutation: The relation of contraries cannot be maintained, to be based on perception or on inference; because of the non-existence of reason and invariable concomitance. But it can be rightly maintained to be due to one subject, because it is proved to be so by personal experience.

*The former cognition of silver being the minor term [Dharmin], the point **to be established** is its invalidity, and perception of mother-of-pearl [or consciousness] "It is not silver" or the objectivity to that perception, which belongs to the object, is represented to be the reason.

This is not right, because at the time of perception of mother-of-pearl the former cognition of silver has no existence (because cognitions are momentary). Nor is the perception of mother-of-pearl a characteristic feature of cognition of silver (as smoke is of fire): and inferential knowledge is not possible from that which is not the special characteristic of the minor term. Therefore, this is also not right to represent the remembered cognition of silver to be the minor term.

Then if you say "We are trying to establish that mother-of-pearl is not the object of cognition of silver; because it is the object of perception of mother-of-pearl."

Then I ask -Are you drawing this inference at the time of perception of mother-of-pearl?"

If so, it is nothing more than establishing the already established.

But if before the perception of mother-of-pearl, then the inference would be defective inasmuch as its reason would be futile (**bādhita hetvābhāsa**);

Because the reverse of what it seeks to prove is already established by cognition of silver which has just taken place.

Moreover (in the absence of permanent subject) who would acquire the idea of invariable concomitance viz. where there is one cognition at present there another cognition cannot be? If the opponent were to say by another inference, then I would repeat the same question and this would lead to *argumentum-ad-infinitum*

Not only relations of cause and effect, of remembrance and of contraries, which characterise all the general transactions of ordinary every day life, but the particular transactions also

such as purchase and sale, which are impure, and relation of teacher and taught etc., which are pure, depend upon one subject, because transactions depend upon some kind of unification. The fact that all cognitions rest in one subject.

इत्थमत्यर्थभिन्नार्थावभासखचिते विभौ ।
समलो विमलो वापि व्यवहारोऽनुभूयते ॥ १४ ॥

Experience shows that all transactions, whether pure or impure, depend upon the omnipresent Lord, in whom all the objective manifestations, so very different from one another, are reflected.

The relation of contraries, which is the very life of all worldly transactions, it enables us to differentiate the real from the unreal, it is also not possible without the existence of one subject: -

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